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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The passage of the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA)1 
offers an opportune moment to consider proposals for corporate and 
international tax reform.  With the debate over individual tax rates for the 
income and estate tax settled for the present, the President and Congress are 
free to consider broader reforms. 
Few observers doubt that such reforms are sorely needed, for several 
reasons.  First, the long-term budgetary outlook is unsustainable.  Second, 
the U.S. corporate tax rate is the highest in the Organisation for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development (OECD).2  Third, the current system raises 
relatively little revenue and large amounts of corporate income go untaxed.  
 *  Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law and Director, International Tax LL.M. Program, University 
of Michigan Law School.  Aspects of this article are derived from a previous publication, Reuven S. 
Avi-Yonah, Corporate and International Tax Reform: Long, Medium, and Short Term Proposals, 
A.B.A. SEC. TAX’N, Jan. 22, 2010, available at 2010 ABATAX-CLE 0122083 (Westlaw) (presented 
at the A.B.A. Section of Taxation 2010 Midyear Meeting).  Copyright © 2010 Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah.  Reprinted with permission.  This article is part of Pepperdine Law Review’s January 18, 
2013 Tax Advice for the Second Obama Administration symposium, co-sponsored by Tax Analysts. 
 1.  American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of titles 2, 7, 16, 26, 42, 45, 46 U.S.C.A. (West 2013)). 
 2.  See Org. Econ. Co-Operation Dev., OECD Tax Database, OECD. ORG, 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/taxpolicyanalysis/oecdtaxdatabase.htm#C_CorporateCapital (follow “C. 
Corporate and Capital Income Taxes” hyperlink; then follow “Basic (Non-Targeted) Corporate 
Income Tax Rates” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 11, 2013). 
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Finally, the system is horrendously convoluted and imposes high transaction 
costs. 
This Article will attempt to raise some proposals for U.S. corporate and 
international tax reform, beginning with long-term options (a ten year 
horizon), continuing with the medium-term (two to five years), and 
concluding with short-term options (one to two years).3 
II.  LONG-TERM PROPOSALS 
In the long term (ten years and more), tax reform in the United States is 
dominated by dire budgetary prospects.  Because of the impending 
retirement and health care costs of the baby boom generation, the U.S. faces 
the prospect of deficits exceeding $1 trillion per year for an indefinite 
period.4  By 2043, under current projections, the debt-to-Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) ratio will exceed 250%.5  This picture is unsustainable 
because neither U.S. nor foreign savers would be willing to lend the U.S. 
government the necessary funds.6 
Since drastic cuts to Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid are both 
unjustified and politically unacceptable, this means that taxes will have to be 
raised at some point in the next decade to pay for at least part of the 
deficit—the rest can perhaps be covered by restraining the growth in health 
care costs.  Raising the existing individual and corporate income tax rates, or 
the existing payroll tax, seems both politically very unlikely and unwise, 
given that our main competitors have been steadily reducing those tax rates, 
that the corporate rate is the highest in the OECD, and that (after ATRA) the 
individual rates are the highest they are likely to go in our generation.  
Raising the funds by closing loopholes also seems unlikely, since ATRA 
once again showed Congress’s appetite for regulating corporate and 
individual behavior via the tax code. 
Thus, the only feasible solution in the long term is to follow the rest of 
the OECD and enact a value added tax (VAT).  A VAT enacted in addition 
to the existing individual and corporate income taxes can be a normal credit-
invoice destination-based tax like the VATs in use in over 130 other 
 3.  See infra Parts II–III. 
 4.  ALAN J. AUERBACH & WILLIAM G. GALE, THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE FISCAL CRISIS: 
2009 AND BEYOND, AN UPDATE 3 (2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/ 
research/files/papers/2009/9/06%20fiscal%20crisis%20gale/06_fiscal_crisis_gale_update.pdf. 
 5.  Investment Strategy Group, Economic and Financial Markets Outlook—October 2012, 
GOLDMAN SACH (Oct. 2012), http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source= 
web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CDUQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.atlantaactuarialclub.org%2F
documents%2F20121018%2FNeeti_Bahlia.pdf&ei=Ut1RUaabIeLgiAKhwID4Cw&usg=AFQjCNG
QXttk9R_mGlbOZ-WBkO4E-ELulQ&sig2=IjcS5p2V-
KvQ3zhdaO1aYA&bvm=bv.44342787,d.cGE. 
 6.  See AUERBACH & GALE, supra note 4, at 23. 
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countries.  It is a proven revenue raiser even at relatively low rates, as shown 
by the Japanese and Canadian experience (both of whom have a rate of less 
than 10%). 
However, as many scholars have suggested, it would also be possible to 
enact a VAT at a higher rate and use the revenue to replace part of the 
individual and corporate income tax.  Michael Graetz, for example, has 
suggested using the VAT revenues to exempt income up to $100,000 from 
individual income tax (for simplification purposes) and to replace the 
corporate tax (for competitiveness reasons).7 
I am doubtful that we can go as far as Graetz recommends.  We need the 
added revenues, and the Graetz proposals are designed to be revenue neutral.  
Nor do I think it is advisable to raise the VAT rate too high.  Experience in 
Europe has shown that high VAT rates, like high income tax rates, lead to 
more evasion and avoidance and to higher transaction costs. 
In addition, I think abolishing the corporate tax would be a mistake and 
would be unlikely to fly politically.  Enacting a VAT in lieu of the corporate 
tax would tempt politicians to see the VAT as a form of corporate tax and 
load it with entity-based exemptions designed to regulate corporate behavior 
and encourage desired activities.  These functions are best left to the existing 
corporate tax.  The VAT should be as clean as possible, with a low flat rate 
and a broad base.8 
However, I do think that the corporate tax can be significantly 
simplified if we enact a VAT.  Specifically, I would support permitting 
corporations to expense all capital expenditures.  From an economic 
perspective this turns the corporate tax into a cash flow or consumption tax.  
This change leads to significant simplification because corporations will not 
have to account for basis; but it should not be a major revenue loser because 
the resulting tax only exempts the risk-free rate of return on capital, while 
economic rents remain taxable.  Most corporate income consists of 
economic rents—the kinds of income that justify the corporate tax because 
the state makes them possible (risk-free returns can be earned in many 
locations but rents are more unique).  The revenue loss can be made up with 
the VAT.  Nor is this change unprecedented—the U.K. made it when it 
introduced the VAT in the 1970s. 
 7.  MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS: A SIMPLE, FAIR, AND 
COMPETITIVE PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES 67 (2008). 
 8.  Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Symposium on Designing a Federal VAT: Summary and 
Recommendations, 63 Tax L. Rev. 285 (2010). 
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III.  MEDIUM-TERM PROPOSALS 
In the medium term, it would be desirable to move the corporate tax 
more in the direction of a pure source-based tax, since corporate residence is 
not very meaningful.  However, we cannot do that without first tackling the 
knotty problems of defining the source of income and transfer pricing.  
Moving to pure territoriality without reforming transfer pricing is a recipe 
for increased shifting of profits outside the U.S. taxing jurisdiction. 
My colleagues Michael Durst and Kimberly Clausing and I have 
developed a detailed proposal to reform transfer pricing and the source rules 
by adopting formulary apportionment.9  Our proposed formula is based on 
the current profit split regulations and assigns normal returns to where the 
costs of producing income are incurred, while residuals are assigned based 
on the destination of sales.10  This formula favors the United States as an 
importing country, and one can imagine different formulas negotiated with 
the European Union (EU) if it goes ahead and adopts formulary 
apportionment for internal EU purposes, as the European Commission (EC) 
has proposed.11 
The biggest advantage of adopting our proposal is that it will enable the 
U.S. to move in the direction of territoriality.  Not only will dividends, 
interest, and royalties within a U.S.-based multinational be exempt from tax, 
but in principle we could go further and abolish both Subpart F and the 
foreign tax credit.  Conceptually, formulary apportionment means that the 
U.S. will tax each multinational (whether U.S.- or foreign-based) only on the 
income that the formula assigns to the U.S. and on no other income.  We do 
not believe this will result in more double taxation than the current arm’s 
length system even if other countries do not follow the United States’ lead, 
but we also think that other countries will in fact follow our lead because 
otherwise multinationals will find it too easy to shift income to the United 
States (where booking it will have no tax consequences under the formula). 
One potential downside to eliminating residence-based corporate 
taxation in this way would be that tax competition might be enhanced.  We 
do not have a problem with tax competition per se; countries should be free 
to set their general corporate tax rate as low as they choose, and we have 
estimated that adopting formulary apportionment would enable the U.S. to 
finance a significant cut in the corporate tax rate.12 
Tax competition in the form of incentives for multinationals would 
 9.  Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. Durst, Allocating Business 
Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX. REV. 497 
(2009). 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 510. 
 12.  Id. at 507–08, 511–12. 
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persist under pure source-based taxation based upon formulary 
apportionment, but we do not regard that form of competition as necessarily 
harmful as long as it is based on a careful analysis of the costs and benefits 
of the tax incentive.  However, formulary apportionment would take care of 
the worst form of tax competition, in which profits are shifted arbitrarily 
without any real consequences.13  The data show that this form of tax 
competition is rampant (eight of the top ten locations for U.S.-based 
multinational profits had effective tax rates of 10% or less in 2010, and none 
of them had corresponding real investment).14 
IV.  SHORT-TERM PROPOSALS 
In the short term, I believe the Obama proposal to apply a minimum tax 
to the foreign source income of U.S.-based multinationals is on the right 
track, because, as long as transfer pricing reform is not enacted, bolstering 
residence-based corporate taxation is a necessary backstop to source-based 
taxation.  The Obama proposal is a cautious first step in this direction and is 
justified by the data showing massive under-taxation of the foreign profits of 
U.S.-based multinationals.15  It is not inconsistent with adopting some form 
of dividend exemption after the minimum tax has been paid.16 
However, I also believe that some additional proposals might be helpful.  
Specifically, I would argue that some of the added revenue should be used to 
finance a cut in the corporate tax rate to bring it more into line with those of 
our trading partners.  Although the effective U.S. tax rate is not particularly 
high, studies show that the marginal tax rate affects investment patterns, so 
that having the highest rate in the OECD is not advisable.17 
If the Obama proposal for multinational taxation is adopted, the 
following further ideas should be implemented in the short run: 
 13.  Id. at 516–17. 
 14.  Hearing on Transfer Pricing Issues: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 111th 
Cong. 1 (2010) (testimony of Professor Reuven S. Avi-Yonah), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/111/2010jul22_aviyonah_testimony.pdf. 
 15.  Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Vive la Petite Difference: Camp, Obama, and Territoriality 
Reconsidered, 66 TAX NOTES INT’L 617 (2012). 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG LLP, ROBERT CARROLL & GERALD PRANTE, LONG-RUN 
MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF INCREASING TAX RATES ON HIGH INCOME TAXPAYERS IN 2013 
(2012), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ey_study_long-run_macroecono 
mic_impact_of_increasing_tax_rates_on_high_income_taxpayers_in_2013__2012_07_16_final.pdf. 
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First, to protect U.S. residence-based taxation from inversion 
transactions, the “managed and controlled” definition of U.S. corporate 
residence should be adopted.18 
The Obama proposals increase the pressure on the distinction between 
U.S,- and foreign-based multinationals, and I believe the current anti-
inversion rule in I.R.C. 7874 is insufficient.19  When the U.K. beefed up its 
CFC rules in conjunction with adopting limited territoriality, some U.K. 
corporations nominally moved to Ireland,20 but HMRC (HM Revenue & 
Customs) are challenging this purported move because they have the 
“managed and controlled” standard to rely on.21  The IRS should have the 
same ability. 
Second, the foreign tax credit ideas should be implemented in 
conjunction with full cross-crediting (i.e., no distinction between the active 
and passive baskets). 
The need for baskets depends on how many U.S. multinationals are in 
an excess credit position, because if they are in excess limit there is no 
incentive to invest overseas.  Since our tax rate is now higher than our 
trading partners’ this is an unlikely outcome, and the added complexity of 
having even two baskets is unjustified. 
Third, we should abolish all “regular” outbound withholding on 
dividends, interest and royalties, as well as the branch profit tax.22 
The need to impose withholding taxes arises from the need to protect the 
domestic U.S. tax on residents who pretend to be non-residents, but this has 
been adequately dealt with by the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
(FATCA).23  After FATCA, I see no need for regular withholding (as 
 18.  See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Beyond Territoriality and Deferral: The Promise of “Managed 
and Controlled,” 63 TAX NOTES INT’L 667 (2011); see also Steven H. Goldman, Corporate 
Expatriation: A Case Analysis, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 71, 116 (2008) (“An alternative approach, used by 
many countries, looks to where the corporation is ‘managed and controlled to determine whether it is 
a resident.’”). 
 19.  I.R.C. § 7874 (2006); see Nicola Lostumbo & Garry Stone, How Much is Corporate 
America Worth?  Corporate Tax Reform and Firm Valuation, 24 J. INT’L TAX 41, 42–46 (2013). 
 20.  See UK in Trouble with EC Again over CFC Rules, PEARCE TRUST BLOG, 
http://www.pearse-trust.ie/blog/bid/62932/Uk-In-Trouble-With-EC-Again-Over-CFC-Rules (last 
visited on Feb. 13, 2013). 
 21.  See id.; see also Avi-Yonah, Beyond, supra note 18. 
 22.  See Dividend Tax Abuse: How Offshore Entities Dodge Taxes on U.S. Stock Dividends: 
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Comm. On Homeland Sec. & Governmental 
Affairs, 110 Cong. 778 (2008) (statement of Professor Reuven S. Avi-Yonah), available at 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=testimony%20for%20hearing%20on%20dividend%20ta
x%20abuse%3A%20s.%20permanent%20subcommittee%20on%20investigations%20(2008)%20(st
atement%20of%20prof.%20reuven%20s.%20avi-yonah).&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CDIQFjAA& 
url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.hsgac.senate.gov%2Fdownload%2Freport_dividend-tax-abuse-how-off 
shore-entities-dodge-taxes-on-us-stock-dividends&ei=cSpTUePMN6zsiQKRyoEQ&usg=AFQjCNE 
aNa6JvpTRFLVQKjZAK8q-tjb4jw&bvm=bv.44342787,d.cGE. 
 23.  Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, I.R.C. § 6038D (2006) (enacted as part of the Hiring 
Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-147, 124 Stat 71 (codified 
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opposed to penalty withholding on noncompliant foreign financial 
institutions, as imposed by FATCA).24  We do not withhold on portfolio 
interest, royalties, and capital gains.25  Dividend withholding imposes an 
unnecessary second level of tax on inbound investment.  I do not believe we 
need withholding for treaty negotiation purposes since we already have 
treaties with low withholding rates with all OECD members, and non-OECD 
countries are uninterested in reducing U.S. withholding on portfolio 
investments.26  Thus, we can save a lot of transaction costs at little revenue 
cost by eliminating regular withholding and the branch profit tax.  We 
should, however, consider refundable withholding (taxes refunded upon 
showing income was reported to residence jurisdiction) as a way of helping 
other countries combat tax evasion.27 
On the other hand, we should tighten up the earning stripping rules by 
applying the I.R.C. 7874 standards to all foreign corporations, and extend 
them to royalties as well.28 
These provisions are needed as added protection for the U.S. corporate 
tax base.  In the absence of transfer pricing reform foreign multinationals 
(and inverted U.S. multinationals not caught by I.R.C. 7874, like 
grandfathered ones) have too much ability to strip income out of the U.S. via 
interest and royalty payments.29 
Finally, I would abolish the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax 
Act (FIRPTA)30 and replace it with a tax on capital gains on large 
participations (to the extent consistent with our treaty obligations). 
It never made sense to tax foreigners on U.S. real estate, which cannot 
be exported, and the tax can be avoided by using foreign holding 
corporations.  FIRPTA also imposes transaction costs whenever there is 
as amended in scattered section of the I.R.C.). 
 24.  See id. 
 25.  See Federal Income Tax Withholding and Reporting on Other Kinds of U.S. Source Income 
Paid to Nonresident Aliens, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Federal-
Income-Tax-Withholding-and-Reporting-on-Other-Kinds-of-U.S.-Source-Income-Paid-to-
Nonresident-Aliens (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
 26.  See id. 
 27.  Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, A Coordinated Withholding Tax on Deductible Payments, 119 TAX 
NOTES 993 (2008). 
 28.  I.R.C. § 7874 (2006). 
 29.  See id.; see also John Mutti & Harry Grubert, The Effect of Taxes on Royalties and the 
Migration of Intangible Assets Abroad 114–16, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES AND 
INTANGIBLES IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 114–16 (Marshall Reinsdorf & Matthew J. Slaughter, 
eds. 2009). 
 30.  Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980, I.R.C. §§ 897, 6039C (2006) (enacted 
as part of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2599). 
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uncertainty about whether over 50% of corporate value is in real estate, even 
for small portfolio shareholders.31  On the other hand, when a foreign 
multinational acquires a U.S.-based one, it can export valuable intangibles at 
will, and that should be reflected by taxing it on dispositions, as many 
countries do.  The tax can be enforced because any buyer of large 
participations wants to register shares in its name and obtain voting rights.  
We should not override treaties, but should renegotiate our existing ones if 
they do not allow such a tax (which many do). 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The preceding has been an attempt to offer some suggestions for long-, 
medium-, and short-term reform of U.S. corporate and international taxation.  
If we want to keep taxing corporations (and I believe we should), some form 
of reform along these lines would seem necessary to prevent the corporate 
tax base from being completely eroded by shifting profits overseas, while 
keeping the U.S. economy competitive with our trading partners. 
 
 31.  See id. 
